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1 Abstract 
A comprehensive study of Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) performance was conducted 
over a three year period concluding in 2016 in support of the Search and Rescue (SAR) Mission 
Office at National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center 
(GSFC). The study began with a review of reported performance cited in a collection of works 
published as early as 1980 as well as analysis of a focused set of contemporary aviation crash 
reports. Based on initial research findings, a series of subscale and fullscale system tests were 
performed at NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) with the goals of investigating ELT system 
failure modes and developing recommended improvements to the Radio Technical Commission 
for Aeronautics (RTCA) Minimum Operational Performance Specification (MOPS) that will result 
in improved system performance. Enhanced performance of ELT systems in aviation accidents 
will reduce unnecessary loss of human life and make SAR operations safer and less costly by 
reducing the amount of time required to locate accident sites. 
2 Introduction 
The subject of ELT performance in aviation accidents has been a topic of interest for the aviation 
community over the past several decades. Although iterations on the ELT MOPS have resulted in 
performance increases in latest generation systems, further gains can be made through 
implementation of empirically-based upgrades to the MOPS that will govern future installations 
of ELT systems.  
It is for these reasons that the NASA SAR Mission Office endeavored to study the complete ELT 
system operational environment, determine the primary issues that may preclude successful 
operation, and define an approach to improving future systems. Because of its rich history in 
aviation safety research and unique facilities to support the effort, the resulting study was 
performed at NASA LaRC.  
This document is organized to describe each phase of the ELTSTAR Study as follows: 
 Section 3 discusses ELT performance as detailed in a variety of studies over time and 
around the world. Based on the findings resulting from a review of these sources, and 
others, a series of laboratory tests were designed for the purpose of studying primary failure 
modes reported to inhibit successful operation of ELT systems in aviation accidents.  
 Section 4 describes the resulting subsytem tests listed below. Test conduct, observations, 
and resulting recommendations for future MOPS are summarized. 
o Crash Safety Testing - The primary objective was to assess ELT system 
performance under a set of loading conditions that were representative of actual 
aviation crash environments. This assessment included both structural (mounting) 
and functional (automatic activation) aspects of ELT systems. 
o Vibration Testing - The primary objective of vibration testing was to identify a 
vibration test environment applicable to ELTs that may reproduce the failure mode 
related to crash sensor vibration sensitivity. 
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o Antenna Cable Testing - The primary objective was to assess the strength and fire 
survivability of ELT antenna cable systems 
 Section 5 describes ELT system performance onboard a series of four fullscale airframe 
crash tests performed under the ELTSAR Study at LaRC in 2014 and 2015. Test objectives 
included obtaining real-world ELT crash performance data, establishing an airframe 
response database for analysis model calibration and supporting recommendations to 
RTCA & the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE)  regarding 
ELT system installation. 
 Section 6 describes Finite Element Models (FEMs) of each airplane that were developed 
and calibrated using the airframe response data obtained from the fullscale crash testing. 
Once calibrated, the models provided simulation testbeds that were used to assess a wider 
array of ELT installation techniques and configurations than had been tested.  
 Finally, Sections 7 and 8 summarize the conclusions and pragmatic recommendations for 
improved MOPS that were derived from the results of the study. 
These recommendations have been presented to the joint RTCA Special Committee 229 (SC-229) 
and EUROCAE Working Group 98 (WG-98) for consideration for adoption in the future revisions 
of ELT MOPS. These recommendations, should they be adopted, will increase the success of SAR 
operations, while also reducing the associated cost and risk.  
3 ELT Performance Review 
The approach to conducting ELT performance research during the intial phase of the study 
consisted primarily of literature review of other publically available studies, articles and crash 
reports published by a variety of sources from around the world. Although some of the more 
detailed studies proved to be insightful, they were dated and therefore not relevant in supporting 
the primary objectives of this study. Accordingly, the initial research phase was further subdivided 
into Historical and Current Performance categories. 
3.1 Historical Performance 
A study prepared for NASA by the Atlantic Research Corporation summarized ELT performance 
after a thorough review of thousands of aviation crash reports and special studies conducted 
throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s [1]. As such, the ELTs included in the study were manufactured 
in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Technical Standard Order (TSO) -
C91. 
Some key takeaways from the study include high rates of non-activation (70%), false alarm (97%) 
and the loss of 58 human lives per year due to ELT system and/or installation failure. These results 
were generally attributed to component robustness, environmental factors, g-switch (crash sensor) 
reliability, and lack of an effective inspection and maintenance program. The benefits associated 
with implementation of FAA TSO-C91a were presented, based on assumptions as to the 
effectiveness of a number of recommendations for addressing the primary failure modes discussed. 
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The Crash Research Institute prepared a study for NASA in 1980 that focused on assessing ELT 
performance from a systems perspective [2]. The review included 1,135 General Aviation (GA)  
accidents and aimed to produce data to assist in the establishment of installation and mounting 
criteria, improved design standards for automatic crash sensing/activation subsystems, and 
crashworthiness requirements. The “Summary of General Conclusions” are reproduced in the 
following table for convenience.  
Table 1. Summary of General Conclusions [2] 
1. In order to have the highest probability of operating properly after a  general aviation fixed-
wing accident, any ELT should: 
 a. be capable of operation in any aircraft attitude. 
 b. be mounted as far aft as possible. 
 c. have some degree of crashworthiness, including fire resistance. 
 d. be securely fastened in its mount and connected to an anteanna as nearby as possible, 
preferably integral with the ELT, and external to the airframe. 
 e. sense the crash as far forward in the aircraft as possible. 
2.  Increased enforcement of regulations could reduce the 8% violation rate of ELT 
installation rules (carriage requirements), and the 5% having expired batteries. 
3. The NASA 406 MHz ELT should be designed with this data in mind, incorporating as 
many of the following provisions as possible: 
 a. crashworthy and fire resistant. 
 b. integral, external antenna. 
 c. aft location for ELT. 
 d. forward location for sensing crash. 
 e. semi-permanent mount, no quick disconnect. 
 f. remote cockpit control and testing. 
Conclusions 3c and 3d in the above table point to a system design in which the crash sensor is not 
integral to the beacon. This is due to the competing environmental factors related to crash-sensing 
and crashworthiness. Crash-sensing is generally improved in the forward stations of a fixed-wing 
aircraft, where crash loads tend to be higher, while crashworthiness is generally improved in the 
aft sections.  
In other words, the very protection provided by locating an ELT beacon in the aft section of an 
aircraft may serve to undermine its functionality related to crash-sensing and automatic activation. 
Therefore, when the crash-sensing and distress transmission functions are integrated into a single 
unit, a trade must be made between crashworthiness and crash-sensing performance when 
determining the installation location for the beacon. Typically, current designs include integral 
crash sensors and the current MOPS recommend installing the beacon in the aft-section of the 
aircraft.  
3.2 Current Performance 
Since a number of MOPS updates were made subsequent to the historical performance summary 
discussed above, emphasis is placed on more recently published works and a selected set of these 
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studies is summarized in the following subsections. Furthermore, a focused set of aviation crash 
reports was studied and is presented at the conclusion of this section. 
3.2.1 Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
A study performed by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) investigated the 
effectiveness of ELTs in aviation accidents over the period 1993-2012 [3]. The successful 
activation rate of ELTs was estimated to be 40%-60%, however, the uncertainty was noted to be 
high due to the lack of information contained in crash reporting. For example, ELT fitment was 
unknown in 69% of the 1,691 cases studied. Information regarding the TSO under which the 
subject ELTs were manufactured was not provided as part of this study. However, it is possible 
that the results represent a cross-section of all ELT designs and that the actual performance of late 
generation ELTs may be on the high side of the published estimate. 
The report continued to detail a number of cases of ELT non-activation in “high-g accidents” and 
photographs of notable cases are provided. The reasons for failure in the case studies presented 
include: incorrect installation, disconnected antenna, fire damage, water submersion, antenna 
shielded by post-crash environment, and “indeterminate”.  
3.2.2 Defence Research and Development Canada 
Defence Research and Development Canada published a study of ELT performance in aviation 
accidents over the period 2003-2008 [4]. Similar to the ATSB findings, the study concluded that 
there was a low rate of sufficient ELT performance data in crash investigation reports as only 13% 
of the 1,301 cases studied included adequate information from which performance conclusions 
could be drawn.  
Successful activation of ELTs was determined to be 74% (64% by automatic means) and a false 
alarm rate of 90% was cited. Suggested areas for ELT performance improvement were presented, 
including: crash impact survivability, fire survivability, survivability of the connecting coaxial 
cable (external antenna cable), survivability of the antenna, survivability and operation on 
submersion in water, and improved educational efforts aimed to address human factors issues. 
3.2.3 German Fedral Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation 
The German Fedral Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) presented a summary of six 
aviation accident case studies to the Cospas-Sarsat Experts Working Group in 2011 [5]. In five of 
these accidents, the ELT antenna was disconnected from the beacon due to crash forces and some 
of these events were human-survivable. Later investigation showed that the beacons were 
operational, which points to antenna connection survivability as an area of concern.  
3.2.4 International Civil Aviation Organization 
A safety recommendation was made to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that 
ELTs should include an additional internal antenna, or the external antenna should be designed in 
a way that the emission of the emergency signal is ensured after an accident. Similar safety 
recommendations were sent to the FAA and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). 
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ICAO raised the issue of ELT performance and data reporting in accident investigations over the 
period 2000-2010 at the 45th Session of the Cospas-Sarsat Council [6]. Similar to other studies, it 
was shown that ELT information was largely missing from crash reports as 97% of the 4,291 cases 
studied contained no ELT information at all. Furthermore, reliability in ELT performance was 
noted to be unacceptably low.  
3.2.5 New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority 
Through interractions with ELT system and component manufacturers throughout the present 
study, the issue of vibration sensitivity became an area for further consideration. Some ELT g-
switch designs have been prone to mechanical wear that would ultimately impede their successful 
operation after undetermined exposure to in-service vibration environments. This issue was 
documented by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) of New Zealand in 2010, and although the 
cited publication refers to one specific brand of ELTs, the g-switch used in that particular unit was 
common to many other brands as well [7]. 
3.2.6 Selected Aviation Crash Reports 
One of the more widely publicized and well documented GA accidents of recent history was the 
crash in Aleknagik, Alaska on 9 August 2010 due to the high profile nature of two of the 
passengers. In total, the pilot and 4 of the 8 passengers were fatally wounded by the crash. A 
detailed report was published by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) that includes 
a description of the ELT [8]. 
Investigators determined that the ELT failed to transmit a distress signal because it had become 
dislodged from its mounting tray due to crash forces, thus disconnecting the external antenna from 
the beacon. Investigators later found that the beacon functioned properly when tested and 
concluded that had it not become detached from its antenna, the ELT would have been capable of 
transmitting detectable distress signals. 
In response to the ensuing NTSB Safety Recommendation, A-10-170, FAA determined that hook-
and-loop fasteners should no longer be permitted as a means of satisfying crash safety 
requirements for qualifying new ELT designs. This requirement is included in the latest revision 
to the TSO governing first generation 406 MHz ELT designs, C126b [9].  
Another detailed GA crash report involving beacon ejection and antenna disconnection was 
published by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) in 2013 [10]. As with the Alaska 
incident summarized above, this case also involved an ELT design utilizing a hook-and-loop 
fastener, which was side-wall mounted to the airframe as a means of beacon retention.  
The theme of beacon mounting hardware failure was again highlighted in an accident report 
released by NTSB in 2013, which described the crash of a GA airplane in which no ELT signals 
were detected by SAR because the ELT “had become separated from the airplane’s structure (and 
thus its antenna) during the impact sequence” [11]. The report continues to state that, “pilot’s 
injuries fell within the “severely” injured category, and analysis of emergency evacuation and 
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trauma treatment resources revealed that with prompt ELT notification, medical response would 
have been greatly augmented, and he may have survived the accident”. 
An additional focus area identified through literature review was fire protection, which was 
motivated in part by several human-survivable aviation accidents [12]-[15]. Each of these 4 cases 
involved extreme post-crash fire, at least 1 survivor, and an ELT that did not function because it 
was overcome by the flames. Fortunately for the survivors, the crash sites were not in remote 
locations and they were rescued by observers and local emergency units.  
3.2.7 NTSB Special Study and Enhanced Data Collection  
In order to increase the amount of useful ELT performance data, NASA met with the NTSB to 
discuss the need for enhanced data collection and a focused set of crash reports to augment the 
current study. At that time, the NTSB was in the process of developing an update to its aviation  
accident report form that would include several fields for accident investigators to populate related 
to the exact make, model and TSO of ELT that was involved in the accident [16]. The form update 
would also provide documentation of ELT performance and observed or suspected reasons for 
failure, if applicable.  
NTSB provided a database of 469 accidents and incidents over the prior 5 year period (2009-2014). 
Although the aviation accident report form in use during that period did not contain the 
enhancements discussed above, useful information related to ELT performance was found in a 
portion of the reports. This database was sorted in order to identify and study accidents that resulted 
in injury or fatality and included a later generation ELT (TSO-C91a, or later).  
These criteria resulted in 62 cases of interest (13% of the total set). The primary reasons for such 
a low number of cases for further study is that, as has been noted in previous studies, little to no 
ELT information is included in the vast majority of accident reports. This is expected to improve, 
however, with implementation of the NTSB’s new accident reporting form. In addition, the 
majority of in-service ELTs continue to be of older vintages [17], which further reduced the 
number of usable cases. 
The make and model of each aircraft involved in the 26 cases of interest where the ELT did not 
activate was recorded. No correlation between ELT performance and a particular aircraft make or 
model was identified. Rather, the set simply mirrored a generic cross section of the class of 
airplanes that constitute the majority of aviation accidents, which is GA [18]. In light of this 
finding, procurement efforts related to full-scale airplane crash testing to be performed later in the 
study were focused on the Cessna 172 series, the most common GA aircraft historically, as a 
suitable test article to represent a typical GA airplane crash. 
Table 2 and Table 3 summarize the data analysis portion of the special study. As shown in Table 
3, the later generation ELTs (C91a + C126) were confirmed to have not operated in 26 accidents 
of significant severity compared to 36 cases where successful operation was confirmed, resulting 
in a 58% success rate. This result is consistent with findings from other sources discussed 
previously, despite the relatively small population size. 
7 
The make and model of each aircraft involved in the 26 cases of interest where the ELT did not 
activate was recorded. No correlation between ELT performance and a particular aircraft make or 
model was identified. Rather, the set simply mirrored a generic cross section of the class of 
airplanes that constitute the majority of aviation accidents, which is GA [18]. In light of this 
finding, procurement efforts related to full-scale airplane crash testing to be performed later in the 
study were focused on the Cessna 172 series, the most common GA aircraft historically, as a 
suitable test article to represent a typical GA airplane crash. 
Table 2. NTSB Special Study Case Summary 
 ELT Operated 
Reason for Non-activation 
(Possibly multiple per event) 
Unique Events Y N U 
Low 
G's 
Water 
Un-
armed 
Antenna 
Dis- 
connected 
Fire Impact Unk. 
Accident 455 138 296 21 74 6 4 1 20 26 193 
Incident 14 0 14 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 469 138 310 21 88 6 4 1 20 26 193 
Table 3. ELT Performance Summary by TSO 
 Unknown C91 C91a C126 C91a + C126 
Injurious or Fatal 
Accidents 
86 33 45 23 68 
ELT Operated 22 17 24 12 36 
ELT Did Not 
Operate 
61 14 18 8 26 
ELT Operation 
Unknown 
3 2 3 3 6 
4 Subsystem Testing 
In light of the lessons learned during initial research and interaction with ELT manufacturers, the 
current ELT MOPS [19] were reviewed and a series of laboratory tests were designed to investigate 
ELT performance under a set of environments that were suspected of governing the particular 
failure modes of interest. The series of tests included crash safety (vertical drop tower), vibration, 
antenna cable system strength, and antenna cable fire survivability.  
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4.1 Crash Safety Testing 
Crash safety testing was performed on a variety of commercially available ELTs representative of 
typical Automatic-Fixed (AF) GA systems. A total of 287 tests were conducted using the 14-ft 
vertical drop tower facility at LaRC, which is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Vertical Drop Tower at LaRC 
4.1.1 Crash Safety Test Objective 
The motivation for performing these tests was in response to several well-documented cases of 
ELT mounting failures and non-activation in human survivable crashes as summarized in the 
preceding sections.  
The primary objective of crash safety testing was to assess ELT system performance under a set 
of loading conditions that were representative of actual aviation crash environments. This 
assessment included both structural and functional aspects of ELT systems, whereas current 
performance standards do not include demonstration of functionality during the simulated crash 
event. 
The reason for including mounting systems that used hook-and-loop fasteners was to identify a set 
of test conditions that may replicate the documented failure mode of beacon ejection and antenna 
disconnect. These systems continued to be available for purchase subsequent to issuance of C126b 
because the TSO only precluded hook-and-loop fasteners in qualification of new designs. 
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4.1.2 Crash Safety Testing 
The set of ELTs tested was comprised of 6 different models from a total of 4 manufacturers and 
included a representative sample of the types of crash sensor and beacon mounting designs that 
were available to consumers at the time.  
In contrast to the testing specified in the current ELT MOPS for crash safety, NASA testing 
included: 
 Simultaneous multi-axial loading of the beacon instead of uni-axial  
 Variety of load profiles instead of a single load profile 
 Automatic activation monitoring during environment exposure instead of beacon aliveness, 
which only requires a post-environment self-test, as defined in [19] 
The load cases were randomized throughout the series with respect to each unit tested.  
A pair of fixtures were fabricated and installed as shown in Figure 2. Each fixture provided four 
mounting planes: horizontal (up or down); left-side; right-side; and 45° (up or down) with respect 
to vertical.  Interface holes were added to allow for clocking of the beacon within the mounting 
planes at 45° increments. An accelerometer was mounted to the drop mass for measuring the crash 
pulse and is highlighted in the view below. 
With the beacon mounted to either of the  45° angle plates, or clocked at a 45° orientation on either 
of the triangular-shaped, side-facing plates shown in Figure 2, simultaneous multi-axis loading 
was imparted with respect to the beacon primary directions. This was a key test parameter since 
the dynamic loading experienced by an ELT involved in a real-world aviation crash is multi-axial 
in nature. 
 
Figure 2. Crash Safety Test Fixtures (accelerometer highlighted) 
The beacons and mounting hardware were tested for functionality and inspected for structural 
damage prior to each test in the series. In the event of structural failure, brand new hardware was 
obtained and the series was resumed with the load case that caused the failure. This was done to 
assess repeatability and cummulative damage effects. Beacon activation was determined using a 
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beacon tester connected to the antenna output and by monitoring of the visual and aural cues 
provided by the beacon. In the event of a failure to activate automatically, the beacon self-test 
function was activated by depressing the appropriate button on the beacon and  crash sensor 
activation was demonstrated by shaking the beacon by hand. Although some beacons were 
exposed to many simulated crash events, only beacons that were free from visible defect and 
passed all functional tests were used throughout the series. 
As noted above, one of the primary differences with the conduct of this test and testing required 
by the current MOPS is that NASA testing introduced multi-axial loading. The series included 
tests along each of the primary directions of the beacon, as is required by the current standard, but 
also included tests at ±45°. This resulted in 2- and 3-dimensional loading of the ELT.  
Furthermore, rather than use the pulse defined in the applicable MOPS, which was 100-g, 23-msec, 
half-sinusoid [19], it was decided that a pair of pulses grounded in research of full-scale aviation 
crashes should be used to study the effect of varying the load profile within the expected range of 
“severe but survivable” crash pulses. In order to determine a pair of appropriate pulses to use, the 
series of airplane crash tests performed at LaRC in the 1970’s was reviewed [20]. This resulted in 
the design and implementation of an (approximately) 15-g, 80-msec, trapezoidal crash pulse, 
referred to as the “P200” pulse in reference to the energy absorbing material used to generate the 
pulseform. It is noted that the P200 Pulse duration and peak-g’s are similar to those used in 
certification of aircraft occupant seats and restraints for emergency landing dynamic conditions 
under Federal Aviation Regulation Parts 23.562 and 25.562, which call for 14 to 26 minimum 
peak-g’s for a total duration of 80- to 120-msec. In order to study the effect of a shorter duration, 
higher-g pulse, another trapezoidal pulse was also used. This pulse was approximately 20-msec in 
duration with peak loading on the order of 70-80-g’s and is referred to as the “P600” pulse.  
It is noted that the total energy contained within either pulse was lower than the one required by 
the current MOPS, ensuring that any negative performance observations would not be due to 
structural over-test. Given the correlation with fullscale airframe crash data and other existing 
standards governing emergency landing conditions, the P200/P600 pair was deemed to be a 
reasonable set with which to conduct the series of tests. A representative time-history of both 
pulses is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Representative Crash Safety Test Pulseforms 
4.1.3 Crash Safety Test Structural Integrity Results 
Structural failure of ELT mounting systems and beacon ejection was observed on a number of 
occasions throughout the series with multiple designs. In each case, the failures occurred when the 
systems were exposed to the P600 pulse discussed above in conjunction with multi-axis loading 
conditions. 
In one case, the failure was with respect to a non-TSO-C126b compliant system that utilized a 
hook-and-loop fastener as a means of beacon retention. This system exhibited the phenomemon of 
beacon ejection when mounted to the 45° downward-facing mounting plane. High-speed video 
recorded during the tests showed that the beacon was able to escape its mounting tray due to 
exceesive stretching and/or tearing of the hook-and-loop fastener. This was a repeatable result with 
new hardware undergoing the same load case. 
In another case, a similar failure was observed in conjunction with a system that did utilize a TSO 
C-126b compliant mounting system. Visual inspection revealed that the metallic clasp used to 
restrain the beacon had become unfastened during the test, however, the behavior was not 
repeatable with new hardware in subsequent testing.  
In the final case of interest, another system that utilized a TSO C-126b compliant mounting system 
was observed to demonstrate the phenomenon of beacon ejection in a repeatable fashion. The 
sensitive orientation for this system was when mounted to one of the triangular, side-facing 
mounting planes shown in Figure 2, with the beacon primary sensing axis clocked 45° with respect 
to the drop direction. Rather than a metallic strap and clasp system or hook-and-loop fastener, this 
mounting system utilized a synthetic fabric strap and plastic buckle. As such, this finding is a 
motivating example of the need for improvements to the existing performance-based requirements, 
rather than elimination of a single design characteristic based on real world outcomes. 
Structural failures of the beacons themselves, including internal components, were not observed 
during the test series or during a full teardown of each unit at the conclusion of testing. There was 
not a single case of a beacon failing an internal self-check at any point in the series, which included 
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as many as 48 tests for some units. Structural failures observed were limited to beacon mounting 
hardware only. 
4.1.4 Crash Safety Test Functionality Results 
Successful automatic activation was observed in 48% of the 190 tests of live ELT systems utilizing 
mechanical g-switch crash sensors. One beacon model contained a solid state crash sensor instead 
of a mechanical g-switch and successfully activated in all 15 tests performed. The remaining 82 of 
the 287 total tests involved “dummy” ELT systems that were tested for structural integrity only.  
None of the ELTs utilizing mechanical g-switches, even the ones that include six-axis sensors 
(multiple g-switches), activated automatically in all cases. Furthermore, all of the beacons 
exhibited some level of “preference” with respect to automatic activation under one of the pulses 
utilized, with some of the units’ preference being characterized as “strong”.  
For example, one of the units equipped with a six-axis mechanical crash sensor activated in only 
1 of 24 tests under the higher-g, P600 loading, as compared with 13 successes out of 24 tests at 
the lower-g, P200 level. In the case of another unit with a six-axis mechanical crash sensor, 
successful operation was observed in all 24 tests involving the higher-g loading, but the success 
rate dropped to 63% (15/24) in conjunction with the lower-g loading (i.e. strong preference). 
Overall, the performance of six-axis mechanical crash sensor equipped ELTs was only modestly 
better than their single-axis sensing counterparts, at 55% as compared to 41%, through 48 total 
tests of each unit (24 each at the high and low g-level). 
Figure 4 summarizes the activation rate for the 5 ELTs tested as a function of the crash sensor 
orientation with respect to the gravity vector. The term “Aero”, or “airplane”, is used to refer to an 
ELT with a single-axis crash sensor and “Helo”, or “helicopter”, is used to denote a six-axis crash 
sensor. “Helo 3” incorporated a solid-state crash sensor, whereas all others employed mechanical 
crash sensors, or g-switches. 
As shown in Figure 4, all but one of the units tested activated automatically 100% of the time when 
the crash sensor was oriented within ±45° of the gravity vector. Outside of that range, performance 
decreased significantly for the mechanical g-switch equipped units. The only unit to activate 
automatically in response to every test was “Helo 3”, which used a solid-state, six-axis crash 
sensor. It was not possible to test this unit in the + or - 180° orientations due to interference issues 
with the test facility.   
Figure 5 displays the activation rate for each ELT as a function of crash pulse. As discussed above, 
P200 was the lower-g, longer duration pulse with respect to P600. As can be seen, the activation 
rate is higher in response to the higher-g, P600 pulse, for 3 of the 5 units tested. 1 of the units 
performed best when subject to the P200 pulse and, again, the unit with the solid-state crash sensor 
activated in all cases, regardless of pulseform. 
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Figure 4. Crash Safety Test - Automatic Activation Rate as a Function of Beacon Orientation 
 
Figure 5. Crash Safety Test - Automatic Activation Rate as a Function of Pulseform 
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4.1.5 Summary of Crash Safety Testing 
The crash safety test series was successful at demonstrating structural and functional 
vulnerabilities of previously qualified ELT systems under a set of loading conditions that are 
representative of real-world aviation accidents. This success was despite the fact that the total crash 
energy and peak g-levels were lower than those required by the current standard (not due to over-
test). 
Therefore, the ELT performance standards for crash safety are in need of revision due to the 
possibility of beacons coming out of their mounts and creating both occupant safety and ELT 
performance issues. The antenna cable connection is typically severed when the beacon is 
separated from its mounting tray and additional injury risk is introduced to occupants when the 
beacon becomes a projectile within the cabin. 
Functional performance results indicate the need for increased rigor in qualifying ELT systems for 
automatic activation and corroborate reports of inactivated ELTs involved in aviation accidents. 
A simple approach to addressing this issue would be to require successful automatic activation of 
ELTs equipped with crash sensors when conducting crash safety qualification testing.  
It is recommended that crash safety test procedures be updated to include additional tests that 
impart simultaneous multi-axis loading, a pair of pulseforms within the range of “severe but 
survivable” crashes and demonstration of successful automatic activation of AF systems during 
environmental exposure. Improvements to performance of beacon mounting systems, antenna 
connection survivablility and crash sensor performance are expected as a result. 
4.2 Vibration Testing 
In light of documented performance issues of ELT crash sensors after exposure to in-service 
vibration environments [7], vibration testing of a variety of ELTs was conducted on the electro-
dynamic shaker at LaRC shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Vibration Test Facility 
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4.2.1 Vibration Test Objective 
The primary objective of vibration testing was to identify a vibration test environment applicable 
to ELTs that may reproduce the failure mode related to crash sensor vibration sensitivity as 
discussed previously. The robust vibration environments defined by the RTCA [21] were selected 
for assessment since they have been accepted by the aviation industry and are intended for usage 
with vibration sensitive equipment and/or equipment to be installed onboard helicopters. Since 
ELTs fit one or both of these criteria, the environments were deemed applicable. 
4.2.2 Vibration Test Conduct 
Vibration testing was performed on a variety of commercially available ELT systems. 
Environment definitions were based on the robust levels defined by the RTCA for general 
application to airborne equipment (a minimum standard) [21], which are more severe than required 
test levels found in the ELT performance standard. Each ELT tested was subjected to either the 
reciprocating/turboprop, helicopter, or turbojet/turnofan environment. 
In order to assess system performance throughout the test series, an aliveness check was performed 
that consisted of exposing the beacon to a single pulse that should result in automatic activation of 
the ELT. The aliveness pulse was defined to be a trapezoidal pulse, 6 peak-g’s, 29.5-msec duration, 
5.5-ft/sec delta-velocity (ΔV), with 1-msec ramp-up and -down period.  
In the event that the aliveness pulse did not trigger the ELT to activate, an alternate pulse was used. 
This pulse was similar except for 15.7 peak-g’s and 11.9-msec duration. Each of these pulses lie 
within the “must activate” range as defined in current ELT MOPS for crash sensor performance 
as shown in Figure 7. If the unit continued to fail to activate automatically, another series of pulses 
were input by the shaker and are labeled as “optional” in the figure below. In the event that the 
beacon failed to activate in response to all of the pulseforms input from the shaker, the unit was 
removed from its mount, shaken by hand until activation occurred, and the acceleration time-
history was recorded by an accelerometer mounted directly to the beacon outer casing. Examples 
of the pulses recorded in this fashion are included in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Vibration Test - Aliveness Pulses Compared to Crash Sensor MOPS 
The aliveness check was performed prior to testing and subsequent to exposure to the vibration 
environment in each axis. In all cases, the aliveness check was performed inline with the primary 
sensing axis of the ELT, which required a configuration change subsequent to testing 2 of the 3 
axes.  
Five different commercially available ELT designs, each from a different manufacturer, were 
tested to one of the three different robust vibration environments defined by the RTCA. Results 
specific to each test series are discussed in the following subsections. 
4.2.3 Reciprocating/Turboprop Vibration Test Results 
The reciprocating/turboprop test consists of a sine sweep and sine dwell to level T, category R, as 
defined in [21]. Two of the five ELTs were selected for this test series – one with a single-axis 
mechanical g-switch and the other with a six-axis solid-state g-switch. 
The unit with the mechanical g-switch failed to activate under both the primary (6-g, 29.5-msec) 
and alternate (15.7-g, 11.9-msec) aliveness pulses defined above, as well as the three optional (7.5- 
to 15-g, 30- to 40-msec) aliveness pulses on the shaker. Several manual shakes of the beacon 
showed that automatic activation occurred in conjunction with pulses on the order of 7- to 13-g 
applied for more than 100-msec at delta-velocities of 9- to 11.5-ft/sec. The unit exhibited internal 
failure during the test series and failed aliveness testing and internal self-checks following testing 
in the 2nd of 3 axes. The test was ended and the unit was disassembled and inspected. It was found 
that several internal fasteners had failed as well as one of the electrical leads to the g-switch.  
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The unit with the solid-state g-switch passed pre-vibration aliveness testing, however, the 
structural assembly failed during the sine dwell at the first critical frequency. Electrical connector 
fasteners failed and degradation of connections between modules was observed. These failures 
precluded further testing. 
4.2.4 Helicopter Vibration Test Results 
Two units were selected for exposure to helicopter environment testing, which was performed to 
levels F & F1 (Category U2) as defined in [21]. This exposure was a random vibration test intended 
for application onboard helicopters with unknown frequencies.  
One of the units contained a six-axis mechanical g-switch and no issues were observed during pre-
test aliveness checks. However, following testing in the 1st of 3 axes, the unit failed to activate 
twice when exposed to the 6-g aliveness test defined above. The third attempt was successful and 
testing continued. Following testing in the 3rd and final direction, the unit failed to activate in 
response to the 6-g aliveness test, but did activate on the second attempt. No signs of structural 
issues were identified during post test teardown and inspection.  
The second unit exposed to helicopter environments utilized a single-axis mechanical g-switch. 
The test conduct defined in [21] was modified slightly in order to assess the effects of exposure in 
a flight-like installation onboard a helicopter, which calls for mounting the beacon to the cabin 
ceiling in a 45° nose-down configuration per manufacturer instructions. Therefore, instead of 
testing the beacon in line with the first two primary, orthogonal directions, the beacon was tested 
at ±45°. The third axis, which is performed with the beacon mounting plate orthogonal to vibration 
input, was performed according to normal protocol. This unit passed all tests for pre- and post-test 
aliveness and exhibited no signs of structural or internal failure. However, because the unit was 
not exposed to robust vibration environments inline with the crash sensor, the severity of the test 
was decreased in that respect. 
4.2.5 Turbojet/Turbofan Vibration Test Results 
The turbojet/turbofan test consisted of two steps, with level and category definitions provided in 
[21]. The first step included a random vibration test to levels E & E1, followed by a category R, 
high-level sine sweep. The second step was a high-level, short duration vibration test to level P, 
category H. The rationale for performing the high-level, short duration test was because that test 
applies to equipment that must function during and after engine fan blade loss, which is a condition 
that may contribute to a subsequent crash event. The random vibration tests were performed to 
levels E & E1 in order to increase the probability of observing vibration sensitivity. These levels 
envelope all potential ELT installation locations, as well as some higher level environments, such 
as the empennage and fin tip. 
An ELT with a single-axis mechanical g-switch was selected for this test series. The unit failed to 
activate in response to the primary 6-g aliveness test, but did activate in response to the alternate 
15.7-g pulse. The unit activated automatically 1 hour and 12 minutes into random vibration testing 
in the 3rd axis, which was perpendicular to the g-switch sensing direction and beacon mount. The 
test was paused, the ELT was reset, and testing resumed until the ELT activated 10 seconds later. 
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It was apparent that the cross-axis sensitivity of the g-swtich had been altered by exposure to the 
environment. Testing in the 3rd axis was completed with the unit turned off so as not to drain the 
battery.  
Following completion of the entire series, the unit failed to activate in response to the primary and 
alternate aliveness pulses, twice. However, the unit reported no error codes when the internal self-
check routine was run and the ELT activated automatically when shaken by hand.  
This ELT was included in the first full-scale airplane crash test in order to assess the affects of pre-
crash vibration exposure and the results will be discussed in that section.  
4.2.6 Summary of Vibration Testing 
Two of the designs failed to activate multiple times when exposed to a “must activate” load during 
pre-vibration aliveness testing. These were brand-new units that passed internal self-check routines 
and used single-axis mechanical g-switches. This finding highlights the need for enhanced 
automatic activation testing of ELTs equipped with crash sensors and requiring positive 
demonstration of performance in response to a series of “must activate” pulses is a sensible way 
to address this need. 
Crash sensor performance degradation was observed at different points during the test series with 
three of the four units that utilize mechanical g-switches. This result included units exposed to the 
“helicopter” and “turbojet/turbofan” environments.  
Finally, catastrophic structural damage was observed with both of the ELTs subjected to the 
“reciprocating engine/turboprop environment” early in the test series. This finding included 
designs utilizing both ball-and-spring and solid-state crash sensors. Since structural failure of ELT 
systems or components due to in-service environments had not been observed in literature or crash 
report review, these results appeared to be due to over-test. Therefore, this test environment has 
not been recommended. 
In contrast, the robust “turbojet/turbofan” and “helicopter” tests both reproduced the documented 
failure mode related to mechanical g-switch performance degradation on multiple occasions. As 
such, the robust vibration tests described above, including pre- and post-test confirmation of crash 
sensor performance, are recommended as pragmatic ways to mitigate vibration sensitivity and 
increase automatic activation performance at the same time. 
4.3 Antenna Cable Testing 
Failure of ELT systems due to disconnection of external antenna connections or lack of adequate 
fire robustness have been identified as recurring themes precluding successful operation of ELTs 
in human-survivable aviation accidents. In cases such as these, the antenna cabling was determined 
to be the weak-link in the system. Therefore, a series of tests were performed at LaRC to assess 
the strength and fire survivability of ELT antenna cable systems. Cable systems provided by ELT 
manufacturers range from generic, unmarked cables, to MIL standard designs. The objective of 
these tests was to quantify the relative strength and robustness of the range of designs found in 
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service and identify performance standards for antenna cabling that will lead to a more complete 
and enhanced definition of the end-to-end ELT system.  
4.3.1 Static Strength Testing Summary 
Static pull testing of a variety of ELT cable systems (coaxial cable and Bayonet Neill-Concelman 
(BNC) connectors) was performed using a tensile test facility at a pull rate of 0.1-in/min. The 
objective was to determine relative strengths of a variety of cable systems commonly used in ELT 
installations. Cable systems were inspected for structural and electrical continuity during and 
following each test. The test setup, shown in Figure 8, included a circular ring to take up additional 
cable length beyond what could be accomodated within the facility stroke limit.  
 
Figure 8. Antenna Cable Tensile Test Setup 
A variety of brand new cable systems supplied by ELT manufacturers and fabricated by a certified  
aircraft technician at LaRC were included in a total of ten tests. Tests were conducted to failure, 
which occurred at the BNC connector in each case.  
It was observed that vendor supplied cables manufactured in accordance with MIL-DTL-17 
exhibited higher static strength characteristics than generic, unmarked cables by a wide margin. 
For example, the range of static strengths observed with MIL-DTL-17 cable systems was on the 
order of 80-100 lbf as compared to 20-30 lbf for the generic cables supplied by some ELT vendors. 
Representative failures are shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Antenna Cable Connector Failures from Strength Testing 
4.3.2 Dynamic Strength Testing Summary 
A schematic of the custom facility used for dynamic strength testing of ELT antenna cable systems 
is provided in Figure 10. The facility was designed to impart an impulsive tensile load on the ELT 
antenna cable, which was connected to the “top coax mass” and “bottom coax mass” by means of 
normal BNC connectors.  
 
Figure 10. Antenna Cable System Dynamic Strength Test Setup 
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The test sequence began by severing the connection to the “top mass”, shown with dotted line in 
the left view of Figure 10, thereby initiating the freefall of the “top coax mass”, ELT antenna cable, 
and “bottom coax mass”. The freefall was guided by a pair of rods and ended when the “top coax 
mass” impacted a pair of stops. Two different freefall, or “drop height”, distances were tested, 
resulting in 5-ft/sec and 10-ft/sec velocities. 
The “bottom coax mass” did not impact the ground unless the ELT antenna cable connection to 
either mass failed. All three masses were instrumented with accelerometers in order to determine 
the loading imparted on the cable system and electrical continuity was monitored across the cable 
during testing. 
The “bottom coax mass” weighed 3.7 lbs and was intended to impart loads on the cabling that may 
be similar to that experienced by an ELT cable connection in the event that the beacon was 
dislodged from it’s mounting during a crash. Since typical beacons range from 2 to 3 lbs, the mass 
used in this test included approximately 30% margin.  
Six tests were performed on ELT antenna cables obtained from commercial sources. Similar to the 
static strength tests discussed previously, the cables manufactured in accordance with MIL-DTL-
17 posessed superior load carrying capability and survived 2 repeats of the 10-ft/sec test, resulting 
in observation of peak dynamic forces in excess of 500-lbf without failure. Generic, unmarked 
cable systems failed the 5-ft/sec tests with peak forces on the order of a few pounds causing failure 
in the cable connections on either end. 
4.3.3 Antenna Cable Strength Testing Summary 
Given that the tested MIL standard cable systems exhibited vastly superior strength and are readily 
available from aircraft supply stores and ELT manufacturers, the minimum performance standard 
for ELT antenna cables is recommended to be MIL-DTL-17. This will help to improve external 
antenna connection survivability during accidents involving significant airframe deformation.  
4.3.4 Fire Survivability Testing 
A series of tests were conducted to determine the fire survivability of the antenna cable, both with 
and without the addition of optional thermal protection. The application of firesleeves is 
recommended, but not required, in the installation of ELT systems under the current MOPS [19] 
and no performance requirement is provided for the material to be used.  
These tests were motivated by recognition that the 15-sec flame test duration required by the ELT 
MOPS does not envelope the nominal delay of 50-sec required between automatic activation and 
initial 406 MHz distress signal transmission [19]. The implication is that test protocols do not 
demonstrate that the system possess adequate thermal protection to perform its intended function 
in the presence of post-crash fire. 
The results of this test serve only as an indication of the feasability of extending the functional life 
of antenna cables since the ability to transmit the 406 MHz distress signal was not monitored. 
Instead, electrical continuity of the cable alone was observed to alleviate safety issues related to 
exposing live ELT beacons, which may include Lithium batteries, to a high temperature flame. It 
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is suspected that the 406 MHz distress signal was degraded prior to when complete loss of 
electrical continuity was observed. 
4.3.5 Antenna Cable Fire Survivability Test Objective 
The objective of this test was to determine if economical, commercially available, thermal 
protective materials may be used to increase fire survivability of ELT antenna cables since post-
crash fire is common in aviation accidents and electrical continuity between the beacon and 
antenna is required for successful operation of the system. 
4.3.6 Antenna Cable Fire Test Conduct 
A variety of ELT antenna cables were tested with and without a variety of commercially available 
thermal insulation materials. The cables were directly exposed to a 2,000 °F flame and the time to 
loss of electrical continuity was recorded. The temperature was measured by a thermocouple 
placed directly in the flame before and after each test. 
A Bunsen burner provided the flame, which enveloped a 1-2-in length of the cable under test. 
Thermal insulation products tested included an intumescent tape and a variety of firesleeves that 
are all marketed for the purpose of protecting electrical cables. A picture of a cable and firesleeve 
undergoing fire testing is shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Fire Testing of an Antenna Cable without (left) and with (right) a Firesleeve 
4.3.7 Antenna Cable Fire Survivability Test Results 
After a total of ten tests, an average time to electrical continuity loss of approximately 2 minutes 
was observed. In the case of a generic, unmarked, cable provided by an ELT manufacturer, the 
time to signal loss was approximately 1 minute, or less.  
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All of the fire protection products tested performed reasonably well and extended the time to 
electrical loss by at least a factor of 2. The top performer was a firesleeve manufactured in 
accordance with Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) AS1072. This material extended 
performance to more than 16 minutes before the test was halted. It was also one of the most 
economical products at less than $3 per linear foot and available from numerous online sources. A 
picture of the post-test condition of the firesleeve is shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Firesleeve Post-Test Condition 
4.3.8 Antenna Cable Fire Surviability Summary 
Given that the SAE AS1072 firesleeve outperformed all other candidate materials tested, is 
comercially available, easy to use, and economical, it is recommended that AS1072 firesleeves be 
required for ELT system installation. This will also address the ambuiguity in the current MOPS 
where antenna cable firesleeves are recommended, but no performance specification is provided. 
5 Full-Scale Crash Testing 
Multiple ELT systems were installed onboard 4 different full-scale airframe crash tests at LaRC 
in 2014 and 2015. Each test was designed to replicate a “severe but human-survivable” crash event 
and included multiple Anthropomorphic Test Devices (ATDs, or crash test dummies) to represent 
occupant and crew mass and establish potential injury criteria.  
Test objectives included obtaining real-world ELT crash performance data, establishing an 
airframe response database for FEM calibration (Section 6) and supporting recommendations to 
RTCA & EUROCAE regarding ELT system installation.  
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During each crash test, NASA utilized its SAR Lab at GSFC, in Greenbelt, Maryland, to verify 
signal detection and beacon location via the Cospas-Sarsat system. This step, which was in 
addition to the local monitoring of the 121.5 MHz secondary homing signal, added to the realism 
of each crash test by demonstrating transmission by the ELT, and detection of the 406 MHz signal 
by the Cospas-Sarsat space segment. The SAR Lab is uniquely suited for this type of verification, 
as it is the research and development system that is routinely used by the U.S. operational SAR 
agencies for development, verification and technical analysis. Consisting of a full, six-channel 
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) Local User Terminal (LUT), the SAR Lab also maintains single 
channel Low Earch Orbit (LEO) and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) LUT capabilities. For each 
test, all three systems were used to verify transmission and receipt of the ELT signal. 
Approval to test the beacons and transmit the distress signals at 406 MHz was obtained from 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) prior to performing the test. The 
beacons were test-coded to ensure that testing did not interfere with the operational system. This 
process was used for each airplane crash test as well as pre and post-test checks. 
Testing was also closely coordinated with the U.S. SAR Satellite-Aided Tracking (SARSAT) 
Program to bring awareness to all operational parties.  During testing, NASA SAR personnel at 
the SAR Lab recorded and reported detections by the LEO and MEO systems in realtime.  These 
detections were also noted, in some cases, by NASA SAR personnel at LaRC, utilizing the Rescue 
Coordination Center Network (RCCNet) remote software tool.  The results of this effort are further 
provided in previous reports issued by NASA ([24] and [26]). 
5.1 Second Transport Rotorcraft Airframe Crash Testbed (TRACT 2)  
The TRACT 2 test was performed at the LaRC Landing and Impact Research Facility (LandIR) in 
October of 2014. The test article, a CH-46E fuselage carrying over a dozen experiments onboard, 
impacted soft soil at 33-ft/sec forward and 25-ft/sec vertical combined velocities. A full description 
of the test, except for the ELT component, was presented to the American Helicopter Society 
(AHS) International 71st Annual Forum [22]. A view of the test article exterior is shown in Figure 
13. 
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Figure 13. TRACT 2 Test Article 
5.1.1 TRACT 2 ELT Test Objective 
Although the TRACT 2 experiment had been previously designed to provide a testbed for 
numerous onboard experiments, the predicted environment offered the opportunity to obtain 
relevent ELT performance data onboard an actual crash event of known conditions. As such, a 
variety of systems were installed and operated during the test. 
5.1.2 TRACT 2 ELT Test Conduct 
The ELT experiment suite was installed in the forward section of the main cabin, on a shelf on the 
left side of the front bulkhead. This location was chosen because, of the volumes available, it was 
large enough to accommodate multiple ELTs and was structurally adequate to satisfy all ELT 
installation requirements for mounting surface rigidity (no more that 0.1” deflection under 100 lbf 
load [19]). Figure 14 shows the approximate location of the ELT experiment suite. 
26 
 
Figure 14. ELT Experiment Suite Onboard TRACT 2 
Figure 15, left, shows a picture of the main cabin of the CH-46E. The picture was taken from the 
midway point of the main cabin, looking forward. Figure 15, right, shows a close-up of the ELT 
shelf area, which was the uppermost of three shelves. The remaining shelves eventually housed 
power distribution and communication equipment for the test. 
 
Figure 15. ELT Shelf Onboard TRACT 2 
The ELT shelf was a ½-in thick aluminum honeycomb sandwich plate with 0.025-in aluminum 
face sheet structure. It was fastened to the forward bulkhead, cockpit walkway wall and frame 
section 120. The shelf was approximately 18-in deep by 15-in wide. In order to simulate various 
ELT mounting orientations, a 6-in square, ¼-in wall-thickness, aluminum box tube was attached 
to the shelf and used to provide the ELT mounting surfaces.  
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Figure 16 shows an illustration of the ELT mounting configurations, with the shelf removed for 
clarity. ELT 1 was in a sidewall-mounted configuration, orientated 16° nose-up to simulate 
additional pitch beyond the 2.6° orientaiton of the airframe at impact. ELT 2 was mounted on the 
top outer surface of the tube, simulating a horizontal floor mounted configuration. ELT 3 was 
mounted on the top inner surface of the tube, simulating a ceiling mounted configuration, and ELT 
4 was sidewall mounted, oriented at 26° nose-up. In all instances, the ELTs were pointing forward, 
toward the direction of forward flight.  
 
Figure 16. ELT Experiment Suite Configuration for TRACT 2 
All ELTs used manufacturer provided mounting hardware installed in accordance with provided 
instructions. ELTs 1, 2, and 3 included single-axis, mechanical g-switches. ELT 4 included a multi-
axis, mechanical g-switch. ELTs 1, 2 and 4 used mounting hardware in compliance with TSO-
126b. ELT 3 implemented a hook-and-loop fastener for beacon restraint. 
Each ELT was connected to an exterior antenna. The antennas were mounted directly above the 
ELT shelf, spaced six inches apart, next to the forward rotor mounting area as shown in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17. ELT Antenna Locations Onboard TRACT 2 
Four accelerometers were located near the ELT experiment suite. One pair measured forward and 
vertical accelerations of the ELT shelf, while the other pair recorded similar responses on the outer 
horizontal surface of the ELT mounting box tube. The accelerometers were of the piezo-resistive 
type, having a maximum range of ±500-g. All instrumentation data were collected and recorded 
via an onboard Data Acquisition System (DAS) sampling at 10 kHz.  
In addition to the DAS data, there were two onboard cameras filming the ELT experiment suite. 
An overhead camera was filming at 720P resolution at 120 frames per second. An aft-mounted, 
forward-facing, high-speed camera was filming at 1080P resolution at 500 frames per second. The 
aft-mount, forward-facing camera was capable of being synchronized with the DAS system, using 
a common Inter-Range Instrumentation Group (IRIG) –B time code. 
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5.1.3 TRACT 2 ELT Test Results Summary 
Accelerations were recorded for both the ELT shelf and box tube and are presented in Figure 18. 
All acceleration data was filtered at a Channel Frequency Class (CFC) low-pass filter of 60 Hz, 
which is the cutoff frequency for vehicle structural responses as called out in [23].  
The peak acceleration values differ between the shelf and tube responses, as the tube maximum 
was approximately 69-g, while the shelf maximum was approximately 43-g in the vertical 
direction. This difference is due to the flexure mode of the shelf, which amplified the acceleration 
peak. The ELT shelf accelerometer was mounted on the aft-right corner of the shelf, near the 
cockpit vertical wall, adjacent to the shelf-to-wall attachments. This placement was a more rigid 
configuration with minimal shelf deflection.  
 
Figure 18. ELT Acceleration Time-History Onboard TRACT 2 
Comparing the measured accelerations to Figure 7, the TRACT 2 environment should have 
resulted in automatic activation of each ELT, regardless of the variations in beacon orientation. 
There was nominal structural responses from ELTs 1, 2 and 4 during the test, all of which utilized 
TSO-C126b compliant mounting systems. All units showed no signs of damage when reviewing 
the video or during post-test inspections. ELT 3, however, exhibited an unseating/reseating 
behavior as summarized in Figure 19. ELT 3 utilized a hook-and-loop style mounting system, but 
was brand new. 
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Figure 19. Hook-and-Loop Mounting System Behavior During TRACT 2 
ELTs 1 and 3 automatically activated during the test and transmitted the 406 MHz distress signal 
until reset as confirmed by satellite transmission log files received by the NASA SARLab. ELTs 
2 and 4 did not activate automatically during the test and, therefore, did not transmit a distress 
signal. 
All ELTs passed pre- and post-test functionality and activation checks as confirmed by the NASA 
SARLab and beacon responses observed on the ground.  
5.2 Airplane Crash Test Series Objective 
Multiple ELT systems were installed onboard 3 different Cessna 172 airplanes and full-scale crash 
tests were conducted at LandIR in 2015. Each test was designed to replicate a “severe but human-
survivable” crash event and included a pair of ATDs to represent pilot/co-pilot mass and establish 
potential injury criteria.  
The objective of the series of tests was to: 1) obtain real-world ELT crash performance data; 2) 
develop an airframe response database to be used for analysis model calibration; 3) support 
recommendations to RTCA & EUROCAE regarding ELT system installation.  
This document provides a high-level description of each test and summary of the results obtained. 
A series of memos have been published that include further details related to the crash test results 
and airframe responses [24], ATD responses [25], ELT performance [26], and photogrammetric 
techniques [27]. 
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5.2.1 First Airplane Crash Test Conduct 
The first crash test scenario simulated a pilot attempting an emergency landing on concrete and 
proceeding to flare-to-stall the aircraft above ground, leading to large vertical sink rates and 
accelerations. The airplane was oriented 1.5° nose-up with a flight path velocity of 64.4-ft/sec at 
impact.  
A net was used to arrest the aircraft following ground impact in order to ensure that the test article 
did not enter a pool used for water impact testing at the test facility. This impact scenario resulted 
in two distinct impact events as depicted in Figure 20 and discussed further in the results 
subsection. 
 
Figure 20. Impact Sequence - Airplane Crash Test 1 
Four different ELTs were installed using typical methods employed in GA aircraft. A schematic 
of the beacon layout is provided in Figure 21. ELTs 1 and 2 were from the same manufacturer, but 
different models. The beacons were mounted to the structural members of either sidewall in the 
cabin or tail section of the aircraft. ELTs 3 and 4 were of the same make and model, installed in 
similar fashion, with the beacons mounted to the aft cabin subfloor supports. The primary 
difference was that ELT 3 had previously undergone vibration testing, resulting in alteration of the 
g-switch performance characteristic, as discussed previously.  
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Figure 21. Beacon Layout - Airplane Crash Test 1 
Antenna locations and cable routing was varied across the set of installations to mimic a range of 
possible configurations. A pair of “dummy” ELT installations were also onboard, each consisting 
of a mass-representation of a beacon connected to an external antenna with typical antenna cables 
and connectors. The purpose of these installations was to allow observation of antenna cable 
survivability with respect to additional installation techniques.  
5.2.2 First Airplane Crash Test Results Summary 
Figure 22 shows the acceleration environment experienced by each ELT beacon. Ground impact 
corresponds approximately from time 0- to 0.4-sec as shown in the vertical acceleration plot. Net 
impact corresponds approximately from time 0.9- to 1.6-sec as shown in the horizontal 
acceleration plot.   
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Figure 22. Beacon Accelerations - Airplane Crash Test 1 
All four of the ELTs activated automatically and transmitted the 406 MHz distress signal to the 
Cospas-Sarsat system as confirmed by post-test inspection and review of satellite transmission log 
files. However, further review of the onboard video evidence suggested that three of the four ELT 
activations were as a result of the net capture event and not impact with the ground. Furthermore, 
it was determined that the ELT that positively activated in response to ground impact was the 
system that had developed significant cross-axis sensitivity during vibration testing.  
Figure 23 compares the relative timing of the visual status indicators for each ELT to the 
acceleration environment measured in the engine compartment.  
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Figure 23. Relative Timing of ELT Visual Status Indications 
Further review of time-synchronized, high-speed video recorded during crash safety testing of 
another unit of the same model as ELT 1 provided evidence that the time delay between the 
triggering event (initial impact) and illumination of the visual indicator was approximately 0.4-
sec. Comparison of this value to the results shown above suggests strongly that ELT 1 was 
triggered by the (primarily horizontal) acceleration environment generated by impact with the 
catch net approximately 1.0-sec after initial ground impact (primarily vertical acceleration). Given 
that ELT 1 posessed a single-axis g-switch aligned with the horizontal direction, the assesment 
above seems reasonable, although not conclusive. 
Since ELT 3 and 4 were of identical make and model, but ELT 3 had already demonstrated 
heightened cross-axis sensitivity due to vibration testing, it appeared that the vertical environment 
generated by ground impact led to activation of ELT 3. The delayed indication from ELT 4 
suggested that it was triggered by the net capture event. Crash safety testing was performed with 
a “dummy” beacon of this model only, therefore, conclusions related to the relative timing of 
triggering and illumination could not be made. 
No signs of structural damage were observed in any of the antenna cables or connectors because 
the crash environment did not produce significant deformation of the aircraft fuselage. 
Analysis of the ATD data and inspection of the post-test condition of the aircraft confirm that the 
crash environment was survivable but the aircraft was not in a flyable condition. Therefore, ELT 
operation would be critical in a similar real-world accident where survivors had no other means or 
cognizance to call for help. 
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5.2.3 First Airplane Crash Test Conclusions 
The observations and results discussed above suggest that 3 of the 4 ELTs activated automatically 
as a result of impact with the catch net and not due to ground impact. Had this been an actual crash 
that did not include an impediment to arrest post-crash forward motion so abruptly, the ELTs may 
not have transmitted the distress signal unless activated manually by a survivor. 
Automatic activation of the remaining ELT is attributed to the heightened cross-axis sensitivity of 
the g-switch as a result of vibration testing. Given the level of sensitivity displayed at the end of 
the vibration test, it is likely that this beacon would have been responsible for one or more nuisance 
transmissions to SAR prior to the crash event and been replaced.  
5.2.4 Second Airplane Crash Test Conduct 
The second airplane crash test simulated a controlled flight into terrain scenario. The aircraft was 
oriented in a 12.2° nose-down configuration at impact with a flight path velocity of 74.4-ft/sec 
prior to impacting soil. The sequence of events are depicted in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. Impact Sequence – Airplane Crash Test 2 
This was a much more severe environment than the first airplane crash test, but ATD results 
confirmed that the crash event was survivable. Given the potential for severe injury, this test 
represented a prime scenario for SAR.  
The layout of the 5 ELT beacons installed onboard the aircraft is depicted in Figure 25. Again, 
these installations represent a range of typical GA aircraft configurations. The ELT 1 beacon was 
installed in the typical fashion for helicopter applications when using an ELT with a single-axis 
crash sensor (cabin ceiling mounted at a 45° nose-down orientation). ELT 2 was a “helicopter 
model” containing a collection of six g-switches. These types of models are to be installed flatwise 
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and again, a ceiling-mounted configuration was selected aft of the ELT 1 beacon. ELTs 3-5 
contained single-axis, mechanical g-switches and were located as shown. 
 
Figure 25. Beacon Layout - Airplane Crash Test 2 
Similar to airplane crash test 1, the antenna locations and cable treatment was varied among the 
installations to represent typical arrangements and a pair of “dummy” ELTs were installed and 
connected to external antennas with coaxial cables and BNC connectors. 
5.2.5 Second Airplane Crash Test Results Summary 
The acceleration environment experienced by each ELT beacon is shown in Figure 26. The relative 
amplitude and duration of loading experienced by each unit varies depending on installation 
location and orientation.  
 
Figure 26. Beacon Accelerations - Airplane Crash Test 2 
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The largest horizontal loads were experienced by the forwardmost beacons, ELTs 1 and 5, which 
were installed in the cabin. In general, peak accelerations across the entire set ranged from 10- to 
26-g and the pulseform can be described as trapezoidal of approximately 120-msec duration. 
Vertical loads were consistent for ELT beacons 2 through 5 and the pulseforms can be described 
as triangular in shape with peaks on the order of 20-g’s and a total duration in excess of 130-msec. 
The trace for ELT 1 does not follow the others because the vertical accelerometer was oriented in 
line with the beacon, which was oriented at a 45° angle with respect to the others. 
Four of the five ELTs activated automatically and transmitted the distress signal to the SARSAT 
system during the test. The visual indicator on ELT 4 was not illuminated during post-test 
inspections, indicating that activation had not occurred. The internal self-test procedure was 
executed via the cockpit remote switch in accordance with the manufactuer’s instructions, 
producing an error code indicating “High Voltage Standing Wave Radio (VSWR) or High 
Current”, which may indicate a problem with the antenna connection. 
Closer inspection of ELT 4 showed that the antenna cable had partially pulled out of the end fitting 
at the antenna connection as shown in Figure 27. Although the installation of this particular system 
followed all requirements, it intentionally did not follow best practice in that the antenna and 
beacon were not co-located in the same airframe station, causing the antenna cable to cross the 
production break between the cabin and tail section of the fuselage. It is believed that the large 
deformation of this region during the crash test led to the cable connection failure. 
 
Figure 27. Antenna Cable Danage Observed After Airplane Crash Test 2 
Despite the fact that both “dummy” ELT antenna cables crossed the major airframe production 
break between the cabin and tail sections, neither displayed any visual signs of damage following 
the test. This finding was because care was taken to follow installation best practices - strain relief 
was provided at each end and the cables were loosely teathered to airframe structure wherever 
possible. 
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5.2.6 Second Airplane Crash Test Conclusions 
406 MHz distress signals were received by SARSAT space assets from all four of the ELTs that 
activated automatically during the crash test, as verified by the NASA SARLab. This result was 
despite the fact that the airplane flipped over during the crash sequence, resulting in the antennas 
pointing vertically downward. 
The only ELT that did not function during the test exhibited two different failures. First, the beacon 
failed to activate regardless of the fact that the measured acceleration environment was in family 
with that experienced by the other beacons and well above the minimum activation threshold 
required. Secondly, the installation plan for the ELT that did not function during the test did not 
follow best practice as the antenna cable spanned a major airframe production break. This 
installation resulted in visible post-crash damage to the cable and an error code referring to a 
possible antenna cable issue as reported by the beacon during post-crash self-test procedures. 
Following best practice guidelines for providing strain relief at either end of the antenna cable and 
teathering it to the airframe wherever possible helped preserve antenna connection integrity – even 
in the cases where major airframe production breaks were spanned. However, the crossing of major 
airframe production breaks is not recommended in any case in order to maintain the highest levels 
of integrity of the system. 
5.2.7 Third Airplane Crash Test Conduct 
The third airplane crash test scenario was representative of a controlled flight into terrain, where 
the pilot unsuccessfully attempted to pull the aircraft up, resulting in a tail-strike condition. The 
airplane made initial impact with the ground at a flight path velocity of 66.1-ft/sec in a 8.0° nose-
up orientation. The sequence of events are depicted in Figure 28. Similar to the second airplane 
crash test, ATD results confirmed that the crash event was survivable. Given the potential for 
severe injury, this test represented another prime scenario for SAR.  
 
Figure 28. Impact Sequence - Airplane Crash Test 3 
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The relative locations of the 5 beacons are shown in Figure 29. Two “dummy” ELT system 
installations were included once again to provide additional insight with respect to preformance 
impacts related to antenna cable installation techniques. The ELT 1 and 5 beacons were installed 
on the cabin floor, beacons 2 through 4 were mounted to the sidewall structures in the tail section. 
The installation schemes were designed to replicate different techniques that are commonly 
employed. ELTs 1 through 4 contained single-axis, mechanical g-switches, while ELT 5 utilized 
a six-axis, solid-state, crash-sensor. This ELT was a new unit, but of the same make and model as 
the solid-state sensor equipped ELT that was included in crash safety and vibration testing. 
 
Figure 29. Beacon Layout - Airplane Crash Test 3 
5.2.8 Third Airplane Crash Test Results Summary 
Figure 30 shows the acceleration environment measured at each beacon location during the third 
crash test. Variations in magnitude and dynamic content seen in the horizontal acceleration data 
are attributed to the large airframe deformation and structural failure of the fuselage at the cabin-
tail juncture. As shown in the lower left view of Figure 28, the tail was almost completely severed 
during the sequence. The recorded acceleration environment at each ELT location exceeded the 
minimum threshold for automatic activation. 
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Figure 30. Beacon Accelerations - Airplane Crash Test 3 
Four of the five ELTs activated automatically and transmitted the distress signal to SAR as 
confirmed by review of the satellite transmission log files. The beacon that failed to activate 
corresponded to ELT 2, which was an identical model as ELT 4. The beacons were installed in 
mirror-image configurations to the left and right sidewalls of the forward tail section.  
ELT 2 passed post-crash internal self-test per the manufacturer’s instructions and activated 
automatically when armed and shaken by hand. This procedure indicated that the crash test 
performance was due to the g-switch failing to trigger. ELTs 2 and 4 were both disassembled and 
inspected. Although both systems were acquired in a single purchase order, the g-switches were 
observed to be different. The coloring and finish of both cylinders and internal masses varied from 
a dull, brass-like appearance to shiny gold-like appearance. The number of coil winds also varied 
between the springs contained in each g-switch. These differences are visible in Figure 31. 
As shown in Figure 32, under 1-g vertical loading, the spring inside the g-switch on the right has 
collapsed to the point that the mass is making contact with the lead, resulting in a “closed” 
condition. However, the spring inside the g-switch on the left is apparently stiffer and the switch 
remains in the “open” condition. Given these differences, it should be expected that each switch 
should perform differently under dynamic loading conditions, which is consistent with crash test 
performance observations.  
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Figure 31. Cutaway View of G-switch Assemblies 
 
Figure 32. G-switch Variation Between ELT 2 (left) and ELT 4 (right) 
Physical damage was observed in three of the seven antenna cables after the crash test. The 
damaged cables corresponded to ELT 3 and both “dummy” ELTs. Although the ELT 3 cable 
showed signs of failure near the antenna connection, the damage did not prohibit successful 
transmission of the 406 MHz distress signal. More severe damage was exhibited by the “dummy” 
installations, with cable 1 becoming disconnected, but intact, and cable 2 being severed as the 
cable pulled out of the end fitting at the antenna connector. The damage experienced by each of 
these cables is depicted in Figure 33 and was the result of providing little to no slack in the cable 
runs. 
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Figure 33. Damaged Antenna Cables - ELT 3 (left), Dummy 1 (center), Dummy 2 (right) 
5.2.9 Third Airplane Crash Test Conclusions 
Four of the five ELTs onboard the third airplane crash test functioned properly and distress signals 
were received by the SARSAT system despite the upside-down post-crash orientation of the 
aircraft.  
The one ELT that failed to activate during the test was installed in a mirror configuration to an 
identical model that did activate during the test. Further inspection revealed that the failed g-switch 
was made of different materials and behaved differently under 1-g loading than the one that 
performed as intended. 
All three of the antenna cables that crossed the airframe production break between the cabin and 
tail displayed varying degrees of damage, ranging from superficial to catastrophic, due to the 
absence of sufficient slack at either end of the cable runs. 
6 Full-Scale Crash Simulation 
Finite Element Models (FEMs) were constructed of each airplane and analyzed under tested crash 
conditions using LS-DYNA and Abaqus as detailed in [28] through [30]. After model calibration, 
a series of simulations were run with variations on aircraft pitch attitude, velocity and impact 
surface. Simulation results were then used to help formulate recommendations for ELT system 
installation. An example of one of the analysis model of the second airplane crash test is shown in 
Figure 34. Some internall modelling details can be seen in the half-model shown in Figure 35 
(Note, DAS = Data Acquisition System). 
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Figure 34. Simulation of Second Airplane Crash Test 
 
Figure 35. Half-Model Showing Internal Details 
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6.1 Full-Scale Crash Simulation Objective 
The primary purpose of producing computer models of each of the three crash tests was to generate 
a data set to augment the investigation of ELT system installation. Once calibrated, the models 
provided simulation testbeds that were used to assess a wider array of ELT installation techniques 
and configurations than had been tested.  
Although it was recognized that there would not be one optimal approach for all variations of 
airframes and crash conditions, the goal was to identify best practices that, if adopted, may result 
in gains in crashworthiness and functionality of the ELT system.  
The survivability of antenna cable connections as a prime contributor to ELT system functionality 
was an area of focus given that antenna disconnection had been identified as one of the classic 
failure modes as previously discussed. Specifically, the effects of implementing the methods and 
best practices pertaining to coaxial cable installation onboard aircraft as a means of reducing the 
probability of ELT system failure was investigated. 
6.2 Cable Connector Force Mitigation Techniques 
It was found that following the best practices described in [31] contributed positively to reducing 
the forces experienced by the antenna cable connections to acceptable levels. Figure 36 shows the 
predicted tensile load experienced by the antenna cable connector for two different cable 
installation schemes undergoing the same crash event. The simulated crash conditions were similar 
to those tested with the third airplane described previously, but with a rigid (e.g. concrete) impact 
surface instead of soil.  
 
Figure 36. Comparison of Dynamic Cable Connector Forces for Taut and Slack Conditions 
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As described in greater detail in [28], the routing for both the “taught” and “slack” antenna cables 
was similar in that they were connected to a beacon installed along the aft cabin sidewall and an 
antenna in the forward tail section. The only difference was that the “slack” cable contained an 
additional 10-in of length dedicated to strain relief. This value was deduced from the best practices 
outlined in [31] where a minimum bend radius of 6 times the outer diameter of coaxial cables is 
recommended. Therefore, a complete strain relief loop for a ¼-in diameter coaxial cable should 
have a minimum circumfrence of approximately 9.4-in. This value was rounded up to 10-in in the 
analysis model. 
The results show that the tension, or axial, force in the taut cable (Figure 36, red curve) reach a 
maximum value of approximately 55 lbs before rapidly decreasing to zero at a point in time around 
0.17-sec after initial impact. The rapid unloading of the cable connector corresponds to the time in 
which the antenna cable is severed during the simulation. The failure criteria for the antenna cable 
model was based on strain data produced during tensile testing described previously and the failure 
load corresponds well with ultimate system strength results obtained in the laboratory.  
In contrast, it can be seen that the tension force in the slack cable (Figure 36, green curve) never 
exceeds 23 lbs and oscillates around magnitudes less than 10 lbs during the post-impact period in 
which the taut cable has already failed. These low-level forces experienced by the cable connector 
are attributed to the mass of the cable itself as the amount of slack initially provided did not payout 
entirely. Therefore the antenna cable connections were protected from being stressed by airframe 
deformation between the beacon and antenna. 
6.3 Full-scale Crash Simulation Conclusions 
The crash simulations clearly demonstrate the need for strong ELT system requirements on cabling 
and ELT system placement within the aircraft.  While it is recognized that there will be 
unsurvivable crash scenarios with excessively large airframe deformations, it is also true that 
survivable crashes can have airframe structural damage significant enough to cause ELT system 
failures.  Therefore, several items, some of which exist in current guidance, should be clearly and 
firmly stated within revised flight standards DO-204B and ED-62B. 
The preferred approach to maintaining system interconnections is to minimize the separation 
between the beacon and the antenna, to locate the beacon and antenna at the same longitudinal 
station of the airframe, and to follow the practices outlined in [31] for cabling that call for support 
intervals no less than 24-in and minimum bend radii no less than 6 times the outer diameter of 
coaxial cable.    
At a minimum, it is recommended that the following be included in each ELT manufacturer’s 
installation and user manual for effective system operation: 
 Minimal separation between the ELT unit and the antenna 
 Locate the ELT unit and antenna at the same longitudinal station of the airframe  
 Cabling support intervals no less than 24 inches 
46 
 Minimum cable bend radii no less than six times the outer diameter of the antenna cable 
 Strain relief loops at both ends of the antenna cable, with sufficient loop circumference 
based on the minimum bend radii. 
These recommendations are further summarized in Section 8, Table 4.  Ensuring that the above 
are clearly communicated to end users not only allows for verification of strict adherence to the 
current ELT installation guidance, it also requires ELT users and installers to follow the practices 
outlined in [31]. 
7 Conclusion 
Several areas for ELT system improvement were identified throughout this study that can be 
addressed through pragmatic changes to the MOPS as discussed above and summarized in Table 
4. Antenna connection integrity and crash sensing, along with installation and mounting issues, 
were observed to contribute significantly to system failures and both can be addressed by 
modifying the way in which new designs are qualified. Vibration and fire sensitivity have also 
been shown to detract from ELT performance and means for mitigating those effects have also 
been demonstrated. 
The overall system performance is subject to the methods used when installing the system and 
connecting its components. Since human-survivable crash environments can be so severe as to 
result in large airframe deformation, it is critically important that the ELT system cabling and 
installation recommendations resulting from this study be required for inclusion in ELT 
manufacturer manuals, and that this requirement be included in changes to the MOPS as 
summarized in Section 8, Table 4. 
Beacon robustness was observed to be very high when testing current models. Although older 
vintage beacons had been sometimes shown to be prone to failure due to mechanical loading 
experienced during crash events, this behavior was not observed throughout crash safety or full-
scale crash testing. This finding may be attributed in part to the addition of crush and 
impact/penetration test requirements for ELTs over the years. 
Implementation of the latest NTSB accident report form should yield greater insight into ELT 
system performance in the years to come. If the TSO field is routinely populated on that form and 
performance information is included, it will be possible to perform a meaningful statistical analysis 
on the trajectory of ELT performance with respect to MOPS revisions and identify further areas 
for improvement.  
It is hoped that this study, or portions thereof, will be repeated in the future when the next 
generation of ELT systems are in service. With the aide of the updated NTSB accident report form 
and database, it would be of great benefit to study and contrast the performance of future ELT 
systems with those studied under this and prior efforts ( 
Table 1 - Table 3). That knowledge will inform the SAR community on areas of success as well 
as possible areas requiring further attention in the development of future MOPS.  
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Another area for future work would be to characterize the performance of the next generation of 
ELT systems under the same or simlar conditions as the current generation systems were subjected 
to in this study. It will be several years before crash report data is publically available that may 
contain real-world crash performance data pertaining to next generation ELT systems. However, 
systems designed under the next generation MOPS will be available for study at an earlier date 
and identification of vulnerabilities prior to life-threatening accidents will allow for preventive 
action to be taken.  
Finally, the unique analysis and test capabilities at NASA LaRC should continue to be utilized in 
order to provide the highest fidelity data possible for formulation of MOPS of ELT systems. The 
airframe models that have been developed under this study may be used to augment the study of 
other crash scenarios and the full-scale crash test facility can be used to perform system-level crash 
testing of other types of aircraft that were not included in this test series, such as commercial or 
business jets and GA helicopters.   
8 Recommendations 
A summary of recommended changes to future ELT MOPS is provided in Table 4. The relevent 
paragraphs in the current MOPS are provided along with the rationale for each recommendation, 
which is based on the empirical evidence summarized above. Note that the first two 
recommendations under “Automatic Crash Activation” were not discussed previously but are 
presented as a means for arriving at a more complete performance specification for ELT crash 
sensors.  
Table 4. Summary of MOPS Recommendations 
Topic MOPS § Recommendation(s) Rationale 
ELT 
Manufacturer 
Documents 
DO-204A 
3.0 
 
ED-62A 
6.0 
1. Require inclusion of specific ELT 
System installation requirements 
within the ELT Manufacturer-supplied 
documentation. 
1. In order to maximize visibility of 
recommendations for improving 
system installation, mandate the 
inclusion of specific requirements 
within manufacturer-supplied 
documentation (e.g. Beacon user and 
installation manuals). 
Vibration DO-204A 
2.3.5; 
 
ED-62A 
4.4.4 
1. Require vibration testing in accordance 
with robust levels defined in DO-160G 
§ 8.2.1.2. 
2. Require pre-and post-test verification 
of crash-sensor performance. 
3. Perform vibration testing in the 
sequence of tests required to be 
performed with a single unit, before 
shock and crash safety. 
1. Robust vibration testing was effective 
at reproducing the failure mode of g-
switch performance degradation. 
2. Pre- and post-vibration functionality 
checks of the crash sensor will help 
ensure functionality throughout 
equipment life. 
3. Including vibration testing in the series 
of tests performed with a single unit 
more accurately portrays the life of an 
ELT system. This is especially true if 
crash sensor performance is vetted 
before and after the recommended 
robust vibration test series, followed by 
shock and crash safety. 
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Topic MOPS § Recommendation(s) Rationale 
Automatic 
Crash 
Activation 
DO-204A 
2.6.3.1; 
 
ED-62A 
5.4 
1. Require verification of performance in 
the “no activation” region for pulses of 
less than 10-msec duration. 
2. Define crash activation sensor 
response curves with increased 
activation thresholds in directions 
other than normal flight. 
3. If crash safety testing is updated to 
include multi-axis load conditions and 
automatic activation is required (as 
applicable), the “cross-axis inputs” 
test may be optional.  
1. Reduced nuisance alarm rates and 
increased performance in crashes will 
result from more complete 
verification of performance in 
accordance with the sensor response 
curve.  
2. No performance specification 
currently exists for 5 of the 6 
directions in ELTs equipped with 
multi-axis crash sensors. 
3. The “cross-axis inputs” test is not 
necessary if recommendations for 
updated crash safety testing are 
implemented. 
Crash Safety DO-204A 
2.6.3.2; 
 
ED-62A 
4.5.7.3 
1. Require demonstration of 
functionality (including automatic 
activation, as applicable) for all tests 
performed. 
2. Require 6 additional test cases with 
the beacon oriented at ±45° with 
respect to each of the 3 primary 
directions. 
3. Require an additional test case for 
each of the 3 primary beacon 
directions using a pulse of no less than 
15-g and no less than 50-msec 
duration.  
1. Crash events are the design 
environment for ELT functionality. 
2. Multi-axis load cases caused beacon 
ejection in lab testing, including TSO-
C126b compliant designs. 
3. Crash sensor performance varied as a 
function of load amplitude and 
duration in lab testing even though all 
pulses were representative of real 
world crashes and should have 
resulted in automatic activation. 
Flame Test DO-204A 
2.3.7.1; 
 
ED-62A 
4.5.11 
1. Require the duration of exposure to 
support system functionality, i.e., no 
less than the time between automatic 
activation and the first 406 MHz 
transmission.  
2. Require demonstration of full system 
functionality after exposure to the 
environment, i.e. successful VSWR 
test of the antenna and coaxial cable 
(outfitted with a firesleeve, if 
necessary). 
1. The test environment should be 
adequate for assessment of sufficient 
thermal protection to perform 
intended functions in the presence of 
post-crash fire. 
2. The current requirement only calls for 
beacon aliveness to be demonstrated 
after exposure to the flame test and 
there is no confirmation that the 
antenna cable will be capable of 
performing its intended function. 
External 
Antenna 
Location 
DO-204A 
3.1.10.2; 
 
ED-62A 
6.1.10.2 
1. The antenna should be located at the 
same longitudinal location as the 
beacon. In the event this is not 
possible, a strain relief loop in 
accordance with FAA AC 43-13-1B 
requirements for minimum bend 
radius of coaxial cables should be 
required. 
1. Antenna connection integrity is 
vulnerable to relative longitudinal 
displacement of airframe stations 
during a crash event. 
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Topic MOPS § Recommendation(s) Rationale 
Coaxial 
Cable 
DO-204A 
3.1.11; 
 
ED-62A 
6.1.11 
1. Require application of fire resistant 
material in accodance with SAE 
AS1072. 
2. Replace the requirement for 
“vibration-proof RF connectors” with 
“MIL-DTL-17 cables and connectors 
or equipment that is appropriate for 
the vibration profile at the installation 
location”. 
3. In addition to the requirement to 
include “some slack” in the cable, 
require a strain relief loop of 
minimum bend radius 6 times the 
outer diameter of the cable whenever 
the beacon and antenna are not located 
at the same longitudinal station in the 
aircraft. 
4. In addition to the requirement for the 
cable to “be secured to the aircraft 
structures for support and protection.”, 
require that such support be provided 
at intervals of not more than 24”. 
5. Provide additional clarification to the 
definition of “aircraft production 
breaks”. 
1. AS1072 firesleeves are economical, 
readily available from numerous 
sources and provide sufficient thermal 
protection to significantly extend the 
functional life of antenna cabes. 
2. MIL-DTL-17 references MIL-PRF-
39012 for vibration performance 
specification of the connectors. It is 
permissible for the installer to select 
other equipment if they can show that 
the hardware is satisfactory for the 
intended application. 
3. The recommended bend radius of a 
strain relief loop is in accordance with 
best practices outlines in FAA AC 
43.13-1B. The study found that 
following these guidelines may 
reduce the dynamic loading 
experienced by the cable connectors 
during a survivable crash event to 
acceptable levels, thereby 
contributing to overall ELT system 
functionality. 
4. The recommended support interval is 
in accordance with best practices 
outlined in FAA AC 43-13-1B. 
5. Antenna cable connections are at risk 
of failure when cables are installed 
across aircraft production breaks, but 
this definition could benefit from 
improvement that considers the range 
of potential types of airframes for 
ELT installation. 
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